Merge tag 'efi-2021-10-rc4' of https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi
Pull request for efi-2021-10-rc4
Documentation:
Remove invalid reference to configuration variable in UEFI doc
UEFI:
Parameter checks for the EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL
Improve support of preseeding UEFI variables.
Correct the calculation of the size of loaded images.
Allow for UEFI images with zero VirtualSize
This commit is contained in:
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
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#define EFI_TCG2_EXTEND_ONLY 0x0000000000000001
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#define PE_COFF_IMAGE 0x0000000000000010
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#define EFI_TCG2_MAX_PCR_INDEX 23
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/* Algorithm Registry */
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#define EFI_TCG2_BOOT_HASH_ALG_SHA1 0x00000001
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#define EFI_TCG2_BOOT_HASH_ALG_SHA256 0x00000002
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@@ -127,8 +129,8 @@ struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability {
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efi_tcg_event_algorithm_bitmap active_pcr_banks;
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};
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/* up to and including the vendor ID (manufacturer_id) field */
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#define boot_service_capability_min \
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sizeof(struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability) - \
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offsetof(struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability, number_of_pcr_banks)
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#define TCG_EFI_SPEC_ID_EVENT_SIGNATURE_03 "Spec ID Event03"
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
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enum efi_auth_var_type {
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EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE = 0,
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EFI_AUTH_MODE,
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EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK,
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EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK,
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EFI_AUTH_VAR_DB,
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@@ -161,10 +162,13 @@ efi_status_t __maybe_unused efi_var_collect(struct efi_var_file **bufp, loff_t *
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/**
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* efi_var_restore() - restore EFI variables from buffer
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*
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* Only if @safe is set secure boot related variables will be restored.
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*
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* @buf: buffer
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* @safe: restoring from tamper-resistant storage
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* Return: status code
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*/
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efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf);
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efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf, bool safe);
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/**
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* efi_var_from_file() - read variables from file
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@@ -800,6 +800,23 @@ efi_status_t efi_check_pe(void *buffer, size_t size, void **nt_header)
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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/**
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* section_size() - determine size of section
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*
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* The size of a section in memory if normally given by VirtualSize.
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* If VirtualSize is not provided, use SizeOfRawData.
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*
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* @sec: section header
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* Return: size of section in memory
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*/
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static u32 section_size(IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sec)
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{
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if (sec->Misc.VirtualSize)
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return sec->Misc.VirtualSize;
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else
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return sec->SizeOfRawData;
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}
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/**
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* efi_load_pe() - relocate EFI binary
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*
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@@ -869,8 +886,9 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
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/* Calculate upper virtual address boundary */
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for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sec = §ions[i];
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virt_size = max_t(unsigned long, virt_size,
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sec->VirtualAddress + sec->Misc.VirtualSize);
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sec->VirtualAddress + section_size(sec));
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}
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/* Read 32/64bit specific header bits */
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@@ -880,6 +898,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
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image_base = opt->ImageBase;
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efi_set_code_and_data_type(loaded_image_info, opt->Subsystem);
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handle->image_type = opt->Subsystem;
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virt_size = ALIGN(virt_size, opt->SectionAlignment);
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efi_reloc = efi_alloc(virt_size,
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loaded_image_info->image_code_type);
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if (!efi_reloc) {
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@@ -890,12 +909,12 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
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handle->entry = efi_reloc + opt->AddressOfEntryPoint;
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rel_size = opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].Size;
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rel = efi_reloc + opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].VirtualAddress;
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virt_size = ALIGN(virt_size, opt->SectionAlignment);
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} else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
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IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32 *opt = &nt->OptionalHeader;
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image_base = opt->ImageBase;
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efi_set_code_and_data_type(loaded_image_info, opt->Subsystem);
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handle->image_type = opt->Subsystem;
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virt_size = ALIGN(virt_size, opt->SectionAlignment);
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efi_reloc = efi_alloc(virt_size,
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loaded_image_info->image_code_type);
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if (!efi_reloc) {
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@@ -906,7 +925,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
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handle->entry = efi_reloc + opt->AddressOfEntryPoint;
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rel_size = opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].Size;
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rel = efi_reloc + opt->DataDirectory[rel_idx].VirtualAddress;
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virt_size = ALIGN(virt_size, opt->SectionAlignment);
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} else {
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log_err("Invalid optional header magic %x\n",
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nt->OptionalHeader.Magic);
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@@ -931,11 +949,16 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
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/* Load sections into RAM */
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for (i = num_sections - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *sec = §ions[i];
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memset(efi_reloc + sec->VirtualAddress, 0,
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sec->Misc.VirtualSize);
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u32 copy_size = section_size(sec);
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if (copy_size > sec->SizeOfRawData) {
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copy_size = sec->SizeOfRawData;
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memset(efi_reloc + sec->VirtualAddress, 0,
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sec->Misc.VirtualSize);
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}
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memcpy(efi_reloc + sec->VirtualAddress,
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efi + sec->PointerToRawData,
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min(sec->Misc.VirtualSize, sec->SizeOfRawData));
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copy_size);
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}
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/* Run through relocations */
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@@ -708,6 +708,18 @@ efi_tcg2_get_eventlog(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this,
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EFI_ENTRY("%p, %u, %p, %p, %p", this, log_format, event_log_location,
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event_log_last_entry, event_log_truncated);
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if (!this || !event_log_location || !event_log_last_entry ||
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!event_log_truncated) {
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ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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goto out;
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}
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/* Only support TPMV2 */
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if (log_format != TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2) {
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ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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goto out;
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}
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ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev);
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if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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event_log_location = NULL;
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@@ -946,7 +958,7 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags,
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goto out;
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}
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if (efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index > TPM2_MAX_PCRS) {
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if (efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index > EFI_TCG2_MAX_PCR_INDEX) {
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ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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goto out;
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}
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@@ -965,6 +977,7 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags,
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data_to_hash_len, (void **)&nt);
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if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {
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log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n");
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ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
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goto out;
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}
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ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash,
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@@ -1038,9 +1051,15 @@ efi_tcg2_get_active_pcr_banks(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this,
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{
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efi_status_t ret;
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if (!this || !active_pcr_banks) {
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ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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goto out;
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}
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EFI_ENTRY("%p, %p", this, active_pcr_banks);
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ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(active_pcr_banks);
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out:
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return EFI_EXIT(ret);
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}
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@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = {
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{u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},
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{u"db", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DB},
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{u"dbx", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBX},
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/* not used yet
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{u"dbt", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBT},
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{u"dbr", &efi_guid_image_security_database, EFI_AUTH_VAR_DBR},
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*/
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{u"AuditMode", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_MODE},
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{u"DeployedMode", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_MODE},
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};
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static bool efi_secure_boot;
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@@ -314,17 +314,40 @@ err:
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efi_status_t efi_init_secure_state(void)
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{
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enum efi_secure_mode mode = EFI_MODE_SETUP;
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enum efi_secure_mode mode;
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u8 efi_vendor_keys = 0;
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efi_uintn_t size = 0;
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efi_uintn_t size;
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efi_status_t ret;
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u8 deployed_mode = 0;
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u8 audit_mode = 0;
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u8 setup_mode = 1;
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ret = efi_get_variable_int(L"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, NULL, NULL);
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if (ret == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
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mode = EFI_MODE_USER;
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) {
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size = sizeof(deployed_mode);
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ret = efi_get_variable_int(u"DeployedMode", &efi_global_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, &deployed_mode, NULL);
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size = sizeof(audit_mode);
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ret = efi_get_variable_int(u"AuditMode", &efi_global_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, &audit_mode, NULL);
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size = 0;
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ret = efi_get_variable_int(u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, NULL, NULL);
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if (ret == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
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setup_mode = 0;
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audit_mode = 0;
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} else {
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setup_mode = 1;
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deployed_mode = 0;
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}
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}
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if (deployed_mode)
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mode = EFI_MODE_DEPLOYED;
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else if (audit_mode)
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mode = EFI_MODE_AUDIT;
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else if (setup_mode)
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mode = EFI_MODE_SETUP;
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else
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mode = EFI_MODE_USER;
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ret = efi_transfer_secure_state(mode);
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if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
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@@ -148,9 +148,10 @@ error:
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#endif
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}
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efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf)
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efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf, bool safe)
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{
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struct efi_var_entry *var, *last_var;
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u16 *data;
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efi_status_t ret;
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if (buf->reserved || buf->magic != EFI_VAR_FILE_MAGIC ||
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@@ -160,21 +161,29 @@ efi_status_t efi_var_restore(struct efi_var_file *buf)
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return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
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}
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var = buf->var;
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last_var = (struct efi_var_entry *)((u8 *)buf + buf->length);
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while (var < last_var) {
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u16 *data = var->name + u16_strlen(var->name) + 1;
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for (var = buf->var; var < last_var;
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var = (struct efi_var_entry *)
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ALIGN((uintptr_t)data + var->length, 8)) {
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if (var->attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE && var->length) {
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ret = efi_var_mem_ins(var->name, &var->guid, var->attr,
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var->length, data, 0, NULL,
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var->time);
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if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
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log_err("Failed to set EFI variable %ls\n",
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var->name);
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}
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var = (struct efi_var_entry *)
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ALIGN((uintptr_t)data + var->length, 8);
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data = var->name + u16_strlen(var->name) + 1;
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/*
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* Secure boot related and non-volatile variables shall only be
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* restored from U-Boot's preseed.
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*/
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if (!safe &&
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(efi_auth_var_get_type(var->name, &var->guid) !=
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EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE ||
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!(var->attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)))
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continue;
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if (!var->length)
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continue;
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ret = efi_var_mem_ins(var->name, &var->guid, var->attr,
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var->length, data, 0, NULL,
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var->time);
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if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
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log_err("Failed to set EFI variable %ls\n", var->name);
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}
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return EFI_SUCCESS;
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}
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@@ -213,7 +222,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_var_from_file(void)
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log_err("Failed to load EFI variables\n");
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goto error;
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}
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if (buf->length != len || efi_var_restore(buf) != EFI_SUCCESS)
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if (buf->length != len || efi_var_restore(buf, false) != EFI_SUCCESS)
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log_err("Invalid EFI variables file\n");
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error:
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free(buf);
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@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
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return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) {
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if (var_type != EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE)
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if (var_type >= EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK)
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return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
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}
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@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_variable_int(u16 *variable_name, const efi_guid_t *vendor,
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return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
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}
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if (var_type != EFI_AUTH_VAR_NONE) {
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if (var_type >= EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK) {
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/* authentication is mandatory */
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if (!(attributes &
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EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) {
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@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) {
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ret = efi_var_restore((struct efi_var_file *)
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__efi_var_file_begin);
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__efi_var_file_begin, true);
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if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
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log_err("Invalid EFI variable seed\n");
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}
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user